ABSTRACT This paper presents a method to perform a live migration of a virtual machine introspection (VMI) intrusion detection system (IDS) from one physical node to another with its associated virtual machine (VM). This is extremely important as more attention is given to VMI IDSes in the areas of both Enterprise and Cloud Computing environments where live migration is utilized for load balancing and fault tolerance. Current VMI IDS systems neglect the live migration capabilities of VMs restricting the monitored VM to that specific node. Our work is to investigate the potential methodologies to perform this task such that VMI IDSes become feasible within practical computing environments. We have designed a methodology to accomplish this goal and extended the VMI IDS known as the virtual systemlevel lightweight integrity monitor (vSLIM) in order to validate our work. We have evaluated this design using manin-the-middle attacks which modify the VM during transit in order to verify the correctness of our design and found less than 3% overhead when compared to the cost of migrating a VM without a VMI IDS. Likewise, the cost of this migration provides little impact on the performance of co-located VMs.
Introduction
System-level virtualization has become increasingly popular in recent years. This is due to the abstractions used to multiplex hardware such that execution environments may be isolated within virtual machines (VM) allowing multiple operating systems, or guest OSes, to run concurrently on a single physical machine. These VMs are managed by a thin software layer known as a virtual machine monitor (VMM). The abstraction provides many benefits including the ability to perform live migration and observe an entire system state.The latter benefit has prompted many researchers to tackle the question of how to detect or prevent kernel-level rootkits while protecting the intrusion detection system (IDS) from being subverted [2, 6, 11, 15, 16] . The answer to this was to use the technique known as virtual machine introspection (VMI).
VMI is the examination of a VMs state including the CPU registers and memory contents. It is difficult to obtain the semantic value of the VMs state. This difficulty has been termed the semantic gap. To bridge the semantic gap, a resource is used that contains a memory map of the VM such as the System.map file in Linux. This file contains a series of tuples of the order (address, type, name), where address is the virtual address of a function or variable, type is the type for the entity including function, readonly data, etc, and name is the name of the entity. This is useful because these virtual addresses can be converted into physical addresses inside the guest and, likewise, then converted to the hosts virtual address.
Many works leverage this technique [2, 6, 10, 11, 16, 21] . However, because the goal is to simply detect or prevent kernel-level rootkits, many works neglect some benefits of virtualization such as server consolidation [21] or live migration. Because of this neglect, it would be difficult for these works to be adopted in environments such as the Enterprise and Cloud environments.
Many VMI IDSes [2, 16, 21] contain state regarding the monitored VM. It contains this state in order to better protect the guest. [14] has shown that a VM is vulnerable during migration from a source node to a destination node and it is very likely that an attacker could easily compromise the VMI IDS during migration as well.
A naive solution is to simply encrypt the VMI IDS state during migration. While this would prevent an attacker from obtaining information about the monitored areas of the VM associated with the VMI IDS, this would not prevent an attacker from stopping the original migration and migrating a malicious VM and VMI IDS state instead. In other words, the original VM and VMI IDS state would be replaced with a malicious VM and VMI IDS state during transit assuming the attacker knows the key being used or can reset the connection and make use of a new key.
A better solution would be to use SSH in order to transfer both the VM and VMI IDS. However, this would require that the entire VM state be encrypted. This could result in GBs of data that requires encryption. This is also unnecessary as the VMI IDS is meant to monitor important areas of the VM and can detect or mitigate the changes made by an attacker during transit.
Our work is to find a method to migrate the VMI IDS state and the monitored VM without greatly impacting performance. In order to minimize the impact on performance and the performance of co-located VMs (i.e., VMs executing on the source node of a migration), we suggest only encrypting the VMI IDS state and generating an HMAC of this state. This will prevent an attacker from obtaining knowledge of the important data structures within the guest OS as well as guaranteeing origin integrity. We have designed and implemented an extension to the VMI IDS known as the virtual system-level lightweight integrity monitor (vSLIM) in order to validate our work. We chose vSLIM simply due to the amount of state vSLIM keeps with regards to the monitored VM. The amount of state kept is dependent on the size of the guest OS kernel, but we have seen 8 MB used when monitoring a Redhat 7.2 VM. Likewise, the design of our extension is generic and should be applicable to many other VMI IDSes.
We have validated this design against man-inthemiddle attacks that modify the VM and attempt to modify the VMI IDS during transit. We have also measured the increased cost of migration while using this design and found a less then 3% increase when compared to an unmodified approach. Also, we have measured the performance isolation of this technique with the use of the UnixBench benchmark and found little impact on performance on colocated VMs.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains related work, Section 3 provides a background of vS-LIM, Section 4 details the design of our work, Section 5 discusses the steps taken to implement this design, Section 6 provides experimental evaluation, and Section 7 offers some concluding thoughts.
Related Work
The majority of related work deals with migration, which determines how to move an object or entity from a source phyiscal node to a destination physical node while connected to a network. This is extremely related to our work as we are moving the state of a VMI IDS from a source node to a destination node during the migration of its associated VM. There has been much research in the migration of differing types of objects including processes [12, 20] , virtual disks [8] , and VMs [5, 19] .
The most important of these works, as it relates to ours, is the seminal live migration work by Clark et. al. [5] . This work defined how a VM located on one node could be transferred to another node on the same network while it was executing. This consists of three phases: a push phase, a stop-and-copy phase, and a pull phase. During the push phase, the VM is still allowed to execute as the entirety of its pages are sent to the destination node. Following the transfer of pages, all the pages still located on the source node are set to copy-on-write (CoW). Any pages that are dirtied at this point will be sent to the destination node where they may be updated. The stop-and-copy phase occurs after this process in which the VM is halted and any remaining pages are sent. Following this phase is a pull phase in which the state for the VM is sent to the destination node where it will begin executing where it left off. This is an important motivating factor in our work.
Migration is a concern of the private virtual infrastructure (PVI) work from [13] . In this work, PVI is an architecture for use in cloud environments in order to ensure that data and VMs are never placed on a node that is either untrusted or malicious. The determination of an untrusted node is made using a lightweight VM known as Locator Bot (LoBot). During a migration, a LoBot is sent the destination node to ascertain the trustworthiness of the node. If the node is deemed trustworthy, then a key exchange occurs assisted by LoBot and the VM is migrated while encrypted by a shared key. This is a similar work as it is also providing method to migrate an object securely from node to node. However, our work focuses on maintaining the integrity of a VMI IDS while their work is providing strictly confidentiality of a VM.
VMFence [9] is another work which places focus on the migration of a VM. This work is an architecture for a distributed intrusion prevention system. This system makes use of the Xen hypervisor and has a single detection process associated with a single VM. The detection process monitors the network communication to the VM much like a network-based intrusion detection system (NIDS). Each detection process uses a configuration based on the VM it is monitoring in order to determine if a packet is "ok" or "malicious." When a VM is migrated, the configuration based on the VM is not transferred until the migration of the VM is complete. Upon successful migration and transfer of the configuration, the detection process is started on the destination node. Our work is very similar in that we transfer the state of the VMI IDS between nodes much like the configuration for each VM. However, this work does not maintain the integrity of the configurations allowing an attacker to modify it in transit.
Background on vSLIM
Virtual system-level lightweight integrity monitor (vSLIM) is a passive multi-monitor IDS that targets kernel-level rootkits based on their deployment and execution characteristics [2, 17] . The monitors are each contained within their own thread. The intent behind this is to leverage the multiple core architecture that is commonly used in modern processors. An overview of vSLIM can be seen in Figure 1 .
There are two management systems: the monitor dispatch system (MDS) and the alert management system (AMS). The MDS creates threads for each of the monitors and exits. The MDS exits because there is no more work for it to accomplish. The AMS periodically aggregates the alerts presented from the monitors and determines if a true intrusion has occurred based on policies that are described in detail in [2] .
The four monitors are: 
The Adaptive Kernel Monitor (AKM)
. This monitor focuses on maintaining the integrity of the kernel executing inside the VM. This is completed by initially copying the area of memory containing the kernel into a "known good" buffer that is concidered trusted. The AKM will periodically scan the memory containing the kernel inside the VM and compare this memory to the known good buffer. If there are any differences, then the AKM determines if this modification was legitimate or not. This determination is described in detail in [1, 2] and will not be discussed here. If the modifications were legitimate, then they are copied to the buffer updating what is considered as known good. Otherwise, an alert is generated and sent to the AMS.
The Module Integrity Monitor (MIM)
. Similar to the AKM, this monitor focuses on maintaining the integrity of the modules used by the kernel inside the VM as they are a direct extension of the kernel and a common target for many kernel-level rootkits. The methodology for this monitor is very similar to the AKM and is discussed in [1, 2] .
The Module Listing Monitor (MLM)
. This monitor focuses on detecting recent changes to the module listing. This is important because a rootkit will typically attempt to hide itself from any process that traverses the module listing. This monitor constantly polls the head of the module list to detect the changes. When a change is detected, it will check to see if the change was persistent after a period of time. If the change was persistent, then it considers the newly added module as "OK." However, it considers the module as malicious if the addition was transient during that period of time.
The Process Listing Monitor (PLM)
. The PLM periodically traverses the two process listings of the kernel residing in the VM. During this traversal, one of the process listings is considered to be trusted while the other listing is considered untrusted. By viewing each list differently, a cross-view validation [4] may be performed. Should the validation fail, then an alert is generated and sent to the AMS. However, this approach is prone to false-positives as a process could exit between scanning one list and the other.
vSLIM does not contain any mechanism that would allow it to migrate along with the monitored VM. Because of this, should a VM migrate to another node and be compromised en route, then it would be impossible for vSLIM to detect the modifications. This serves as a motivation for our work.
Design
The primary goal in the design of our system is to maintain the integrity of a VMI IDS during the migration of itself and its associated VM. This is because the majority of known attacks against live-migration compromise a VMs integrity during transit [14] and these same attacks could be used against a VMI IDS. It would not be difficult for an attacker to alter an utility that compromises a VM during transit to also modify the associated VMI IDS. In this section, we will detail our design by first discussing the overall scope of the design and then discuss two components that encompass our work: (i) the VMI IDS migration module and (ii) the synchronization module.
Scope
The scope of this work is focused on the migration of a VMI IDS and its monitored VM from a source node to a destination node and the securing of this migration from attacks that would modify the VMI IDS during transit.
We view this as important for various reasons. First, in order for a VMI IDS work to be adopted by both Enterprise and Cloud Computing environments, these works need to be usable under normal operating conditions. One such condition is the repeated live migration of VMs from node to node for either load-balancing or fault tolerance reasons. This is a condition because the VMI IDS will contain state regarding the VM being migrated and will need to transfer that state to the destination node in order to continue monitoring the VM.
In [14] , it was shown that live migration is susceptible to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks as well as attacks on the protocols used as long as the attacker is on the same network. However, as research has been conducted showing that live migration is possible even over WANs [19] , then the attacker can either be on the senders network or the receivers network.
The motivation of the attacker may vary, but we are assuming that the goal of the attacker is to modify the VMI IDS much like they would a VM. Because of this, we wish to focus purely on maintaining the integrity of the VMI IDS state. This would prevent modifications to the VMI IDS and also protect the VM as the VMI IDS should detect any modifications or differences in state.
The VMI IDS Migration Module
This module handles all of the steps necessary in order to perform the migration of the VMI IDS state from a source node to a destination node. It is assumed prior to migration that a key exchange has occurred and each node has a shared secret key for use with encryption and with the generation of a HMAC. The key for use with encryption will be donated K E and the key for use with the generating of a HMAC will be donated K H . It is also assumed that these two keys are different. The following steps are for sending the VMI IDS state:
1. Perform an HMAC on the VMI IDS state with K H to be sent to the destination. An HMAC should be generated on the unencrypted form of the VMI IDS state. This is completed using a SHA algorithm of 256 bits or higher in order to avoid any potential collisions. This leaves the implementation open as to the system it will be executed on as it has been shown that SHA-512 is faster than SHA-256 on the 64-bit Intel architecture which is commonly used in data centers [7] .
2. Perform encryption on the VMI IDS state with K E to be sent to the destination. Encrypting the state will provide confidentiality. While this is not our primary focus, it will require an attacker to gain access to two keys instead of one in order to compromise the VMI IDS during a migration.
3. Send both the HMAC and encrypted VMI IDS state to the destination. After sending the HMAC and encrypted state, the VM at the source node should be stopped and can be destroyed after it has completed its migration. The VMI IDS associated with the VM at the source node can also be destroyed as its state is now located on the destination node.
4.
Receive both the HMAC and encrypted state from the source. Other than negotiating keys, this is the first step for the destination.
Likewise, the following are the steps for the receiving node:
1. Receive both the HMAC and encrypted state from the source. Receive the data from the source node. At the same time, the VMM should be receiving the VM state. The SM will guarantee that the VM does not begin execution until this and the next steps are completed. However, it is highly likely that these steps will complete prior to the VM state finishing its transfer.
2. Unencrypt the state and generate a new HMAC to compare against the delivered HMAC. The destination node will unencrypt the VMI IDS state with K E and proceed to generate a new HMAC using the same method as the source node including K H . When this HMAC is generated, a comparison is made between the delivered HMAC and the generated HMAC to determine if any modifications had been made. If there had been modifications, then the received items including the VM will be discarded. Otherwise, the comparison matches and the VMI IDS migration module signals the synchronization module (SM) to start the execution of the received VM.
The Synchronization Module
An important aspect when designing this system was to maintain the integrity of the VMI IDS during the migration. However, it is also important to maintain the integrity of the monitored VM at all times during the migration. This means that there must be some mechanism to correctly determine the instant in which to perform the migrations.
To correctly determine a starting and stopping point of a migration requires that the live migration algorithm [5] be examined. This algorithm contains three phases: (i) push phase, (ii) stop-and-copy phase, and (iii) pull phase. In the push phase, the source VMM sends all the memory pages associated with the VM to the destination VMM. After the memory pages are sent, the VMM modifies each memory page changing it to copy-on-write. At this point, the VM is still executing. Because of this, the push phase is a not a suitable time to initiate the VMI IDS migration as the VM is still executing. However, during the stop-and-copy phase, the VM is stopped and all remaining memory pages are sent to the destination. After this point, the VM will not execute anymore and is a suitable location to start the VMI IDS migration.
When restarting the VM at the destination node, it is important that the VM not be started without the VMI IDS monitoring it. This means that while the VM may be received, it may not execute. The synchronization module (SM) handles this by halting the VMMs migration module from resuming the VM until the VMI IDS has completed its migration.
Implementation
We have implemented a prototype of this design by extending the VMI IDS known as the virtual system-level lightweight integrity monitor (vSLIM) and the VMM known as the kernel-based virtual machine (KVM). We chose vSLIM as it contains state regarding the monitored guest. It should be noted that this design is generic and should be applicable to other VMI IDSes. KVM is used as the VMM because vSLIM relies on KVM in order to function and because it uses the same algorithm concerning migration as other VMMs such as the Xen hypervisor [3] .
Based on vSLIMs design, we integrated the VMI IDS migration module (VIMM) within the monitor dispatch system (MDS). This is because the MDS is the initial thread of execution for vSLIM when a VM is started and the primary goal of the MDS is to initialize the state for each monitor prior to their execution. By integrating the VIMM within the MDS, we can stop the MDS from starting the various monitors with incorrect state when receiving a migration. Instead, it will begin listening on a port for an incoming HMAC and an encrypted state from the source node. For our extension, we used SHA-256 for the HMAC and AES-256 for our encryption.
To implement the synchronization module (SM), we needed to modify very few lines of both the VMM migration module and the MDS in order to correctly synchronize the starting and stopping of the migration. Figure 2 shows the resulting architecture when adding this design to vS-LIM.
Experimental Evaluation
In order to evaluate this work, we see two points in which to validate. The first is that of correctness. This means we are meeting the claims we have stated by correctly mitigating the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks that modify the VMI IDS during transit. The second point is of performance and performance isolation. In this section, we will first discuss the testbed for our tests and then elaborate on the mitigation of MITM attacks followed by a discussion on the performance and performance isolation.
For our experiments, our testbed consists of two nodes with dual Intel Xeon X5690s, 12 GB of RAM, and Gb Ethernet serving as the interconnect. These machines are running Ubuntu 10.04 with KVM and vSLIM. Our Figure 3 . This shows the attacks that were used while validating the design. In (1), Eve is intercepting the transfer of the VM from Alice to Bob and modifying the VM while in transit. In (2), Eve is intercepting the transfer of the VMI IDS state from Alice to Bob and modifying the state while in transit.
VMs to be used during the tests are running Redhat 7.2 and have 512 MB of RAM allocated per VM.
Correctness
We wish to measure the correctness of this design in terms of mitigating MITM attacks that modify the VMI IDS during transit. To determine this, we see the modification of the VM or the VMI IDS state as the most important MITM attack because the integrity of the VM or VMI IDS may be compromised by such attacks. We setup a third node of similar specifications on our network in order to perform the attacks. For the sake of confusion, we are labeling our testbed nodes as Alice and Bob while the attacking node will be labeled as Eve. These attacks can be seen in Figure 3 .
We have chosen two attacks to complete:
1. Modification of the VM during transit. In this experiment, we will migrate a VM from Alice to Bob. During the migration, Eve will place herself between Alice and Bob and intercept the VM. When Eve intercepts the VM, she will modify a portion of the kernel inside the VM. If our design works correctly, this should be allowed until vSLIM starts on Bob. vSLIM should quickly notice the modification and repair it.
2. Modification of the VMI IDS during transit. In this experiment, we are also migrating a VM from Alice to Bob. However, during this migration, Eve will The result of the first test is that the VM was modified during transit, but as vSLIM started on Bob the modification was detected by vSLIM and corrected. Without vSLIM, the modification would have remained. This suggests that migrating the VMI IDS state along with the VM does have benefits in terms of maintaining integrity when the VM starts at the destination. This also suggests that the inclusion of a VMI IDS may allow for the secure migration of a VM without the requirement of encrypting the entire VM state.
The result of the second test was similar as vSLIMs state was modified during transit. However, when vSLIM unencrypted the state and generated a new HMAC, the comparison was found to be a mismatch. Upon discovering the mismatch, vSLIM rejected the migrated state and also caused the VM that was migrated to be rejected as it could not be trusted as well. This suggests that the integrity of the VMI IDS state can be maintained unless the attacker is able to gain knowledge of both secret keys. This is because even if the VMI IDS state was modified correctly, the HMAC that was generated would be different than the original HMAC.
Performance
In a Cloud environment, nodes within a data center typically have many VMs executing on top of them. This is coupled with service level agreements (SLAs) that are contracts between the provider and the user as to the performance levels that are expected. With both of these factors, in order to be adopted in industry, it is paramount that the performance impact of this design be minimal.
To evaluate the performance, we wished to look at two points. The first point is to determine if there is any additional overhead added to a migration. The second point is if this design would greatly impact performance isolation. In other words, we want to guarantee that when migrating a VM and VMI IDS from node to node, there will be no threat of breaking an SLA agreement of a VM that is colocated on a node. With respect to the first point, we simply migrated a VM from one node to another node while measuring the time taken from accepting the connection to starting the VM on the destination node. This is because there are more operations on the receive side as first the state must be unencrypted, then a HMAC is computed, and then the computed HMAC is compared with the one received. Likewise, the receiving of a VM is the only point in which KVM is waiting on vSLIM to inform it of a completed transfer. The timings related to this can be seen in Table 1 .
Without including the VMI IDS migration (VIM), we found that the migration took 5.87 seconds on average with a standard deviation of 1.50. When including the VIM, we found that migration took on average 6.04 seconds with a standard deviation of 1.83. This indicates that there is some overhead when using this design with a wider range of possible timings. This makes the cost of migration less predictable. While less predictable migration timings are not positive, the difference between migrating the VMI IDS state and not migrating it is very little. Likewise, there was only 2.99% overhead suggesting that this technique may be reasonable for Cloud environments.
For our second point, which was to determine if our design effected the performance of co-located VMs, we decided to run 5 VMs, all of which would be monitored by vSLIM. We would then run a benchmark in one VM while we continually migrated another VM between that node and a destination node. This would simply measure the effect of the migration on the co-located nodes, which includes encrypting and generating an HMAC. The results for this test can be seen in Table 2 .
The benchmark we chose for this test was the UnixBench [18] benchmark suite which contains microbenchmarks which measure the performance of the system at various areas. The result of the benchmark is a score. The score is simply an index in which to rate a system based on the authors of the benchmark's baseline scores. In this benchmark, higher scores are better.
We found that in 11 out of the 13 tests, there was less than 1% difference between a system migrating the VMI IDS and a system not migrating a VMI IDS. This result suggests that the encryption that occurs and the generation of the HMAC does not effect the performance of other VMs in a noticeable way.
Conclusion
Research into VMI IDSes have produced several solutions to the problems of how to monitor an untrusted environment while preventing the IDS from being compromised. However, many of these works neglect the migration of the VMI IDS and its monitored VM. This is important because any state related to the VM contained within the VMI IDS will be lost as the VM migrates to another node.
In this paper, we have presented a design that provides a solution to how a VMI IDS can be migrated along with the VM it is monitoring. This is possible with the addition of two modules to a VMI IDS and the underlying VMM. These modules make use of encryption in order to maintain confidentiality and HMAC in order to maintain origin integrity while the VMI IDS and VM are in transit. Through validation, we showed that this approach does effectively prevent MITM attacks, adds less than 3% overhead with respect to migration when compared to migration without a VMI IDS, and does not impede performance on co-located VMs in any significant manner.
